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One of the most challenging issues that economists are dealing with is the 
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exposing the potential crisis transmission channels has attracted considerable interest. 
Aiming to contribute to this literature, we construct financial stress indices on a 
country level and explore further the potential inter-reactions between the source 
causes of systemic risk. The country specific index consists of a wide number of 
series drawn from the money, equity and bond markets, and the banking sector of 
each Eurozone country. A Euro Area stress index is also provided, exploring the 
evolution of financial conditions for this group of countries. The investigation of the 
potential transmission channels is implemented through a multivariate analysis and 
the corresponding impulse responses’ dynamics. The empirical findings suggest that 
countries are mostly responsive to their own financial shocks, while a degree of 
regionalism is also evident. That is, the peripheral countries are more susceptible to 
their financial stress, while the same holds for the core Eurozone countries. 
Additionally, in contrast to common wisdom, financial conditions in Greece and 
Portugal do not seem to affect the rest of the Euro Area, at least in the degree that 
Italy and Ireland do. These results are consistent under alternative model and sample 
specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Since 2007, the global economy is getting through one of the most unstable 
periods in modern history. The problems that were raised in the sub-prime mortgage 
market in United States quickly spread to the global financial system and created an 
unprecedented financial crisis, which greatly affected the growth prospects of the 
world economy for many years. The interconnectedness of the various markets and 
national economies are so tight, that monetary authorities were forced to proceed to 
economic policies never applied before to such a wide scale and number of developed 
countries. It is not by accident that the current period is now known as the Great 
Recession. 
The fundamental reason for reaching such levels of recession is the strong and 
perplexed interrelation of the financial system with the real economy. Moreover, the 
fact that financial markets consist of a number of actual different markets, like the 
banking market, the bond market, money market and so on, each one driven by its 
own distinctive forces, makes things even more complex and difficult for assessing 
the underlying causes of financial turmoils and deciding on the optimal policies for 
the alleviation of market instabilities. Central bank authorities employ monetary 
policy measures, in order to intervene and stabilize the economy, while the financial 
stability and financial stress assessment was a recent addition to their mandate. In any 
case, even the so-called monetary policy transmission channel is not, yet, thoroughly 
evaluated and tracked down the different ways through which it can affect the 
aforementioned. In order to perform such an evaluation, a measure able to identify 
financial system impairments is necessary. Hence, there is a need for using financial 
stress indices, able to clearly depict systemic risk. 
Another reason, rendering the employment of such financial stress measures 
necessary, is the fact that the same nature of financial crises has been multifaceted. As 
it has been evident in the last few years, during Great Recession, the sources and 
causes of a financial crisis can significantly vary, in accordance to changes taking 
place in the financial market conditions and investors sentiment. For instance, the 
current financial crisis begun from a, relatively small, uninteresting, financial market, 
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States. Soon, it has infected several 
markets and economies around the world, with this crisis reaching its peak with the 
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Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008. This situation brought a major 
disruption in money markets, as well as the interbank funding market, leading to a 
drying up of liquidity in a global level. In turn, this had major repercussions on capital 
struggling companies, households and countries, brining up more transformation of 
this crisis into a banking one and, lately, a sovereign debt crisis. As it is also 
emphasized by Sandahl et. al (2011), an authoritative study of the whole financial 
system, is of utmost importance and can be accomplished using financial stress 
measures. In this way, a clear and timely depiction of the prevailing conditions in 
each financial market is possible, while it is also an efficient way to assess the market-
wide systemic risk for the economy. Finally, these indices can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the monetary policies followed by central banks, since tools used by 
the latter are integral parts of the aggregate financial stress indexes. 
As it has been clear from the previous discussion, there is great scope for the 
implementation of financial stress indices, especially in the present situation, where 
the need for indicators of systemic-wide financial instabilities is extremely important. 
Here, we are going to construct a series of financial stress indicators, in order to 
analyze the current Eurozone crisis. This is an important motivation for this piece of 
research, since the unprecedented level of financial and sovereign turmoil in the Euro 
Area should be investigated and scrutinized. In order to do it, we employ a wide 
number of indicators, originated from the most important financial markets. These are 
the banking sector, the money, equity and bond market of each one of the eleven 
original Eurozone countries1. In this way, we construct five stress indices for each 
country (four sectorial, one country-wide), while an index for the whole union is also 
provided. The weighting scheme used to aggregate the individual indexes is the 
variance-equal approach, where each single indicator contributes to the aggregate 
index equivalently. 
In the second stage of this empirical assessment of the Eurozone crisis, we 
provide initial evidence on the implied interrelation between the markets and the 
countries financial (in)-stability. The existence of trade and tight financial connections 
between euro currency countries, along with the existence of a unified monetary 
authority, deciding on the kind of monetary policies followed by all these countries, 
                                                 
1 Luxembourg is not included, since it is a small economy, without major interactions with the other 
core Eurozone countries. Also, even though Greece joined the common currency a bit later (2001), its 
alleged contribution to the current crisis renders its inclusion to the analysis quite important. 
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justifies and strengthens the necessity of such an econometric investigation. The 
provision of such empirical evidence leads to the establishment of interactions among 
the markets and the countries under exploration, providing further evidence in one of 
the hottest debates of concurrent financial literature. That is, the existence of channels 
of interdependence and contagion of the financial crisis from one country to another. 
With our work here, we expand the literature in many ways. First, it is possible to 
examine channels of crisis transmission using aggregate indexes of systemic risk, on a 
cross country level. Thus, a more detailed analysis of potential stress sources is 
possible. Additionally, such an empirical evaluation of intra-Euro area 
interdependencies is useful for policy purposes, since the detailed and exhaustive 
indagation of the aforementioned indices and interrelations prove the necessity of 
different kind of policies in different countries and cases of financial upheavals. 
Moreover, these stress indexes are ideal as early warning indicators of forthcoming 
financial abnormalities, since their advantage is the timely information they provide 
for the current state of the financial markets. 
The empirical work involves the usage of vector autoregressive (VAR, 
hereafter) models, specifically impulse response analysis, in order to examine the 
interrelations of the aforementioned economies, through the financial stress indices. A 
plethora of empirical findings are provided, regarding the Euro area financial crisis 
interrelations, the driving forces behind it and its main propagators. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section two, a discussion of the most 
important papers, dealing with the measurement of European countries financial stress 
is provided. Then, the dataset employed is presented, emphasizing the usefulness and 
importance of the indicators included in the systemic stress indexes. Moreover, the 
econometric methodology adopted is presented. In section four, the Euro wide index 
is discussed, together with its features and its effectiveness as tool of financial system 
safeguarding. Part five provides an exposition and justification of the econometric 
results and part six provides further empirical evidence and robustness checks. The 
last part recaps and concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
2. Financial Stress Measures for Eurozone and European Countries: 
An account of the relevant literature 
 
 
The literature on financial stress (or, as some of the authors call them, 
financial fragility) indices (FSI), has mushroomed the last decade. It is a branch of the 
research developed as a continuation of the early warning indicators (EWI) literature, 
models that have been used in previous empirical work on, mainly, currency and 
banking crises episodes. With the FSI approach, a series with continuous values is 
provided, offering a timely illustration of the market conditions, thus, better 
monitoring of the financial system is possible.  
The development of financial stress indices was initiated from economists in 
developed economies. It is reasonable, since the necessity for such tools was stronger 
to the economies mostly harshly hit by the recent financial crisis. Additionally, a great 
deal of such research is accomplished by economists in policy making institutions, 
such as IMF, OECD and central banks. The majority of the papers cope with the US 
economy, while there is growing interest for Eurozone’s case. 
Illing and Liu (2006) outbid for the creation of an FSI as a well-suited index of 
financial stress for developed economies, compared to other early warning indicators. 
The authors are mainly interested into three tasks here. First, they want to specify 
which time periods can be considered as stress periods for the Canadian economy, 
then which variables they should use to create their FSI and, finally, which one of the 
different FSI’s they compute is the most efficient. For the first task, they conducted a 
survey within the Bank of Canada economists, collecting answers on a series of 
questions. Then, they experiment with different methodologies and a series of 
variables2, in order to develop a financial stress index for the Canadian economy. 
Trying to further refine their work, the authors apply different weighting scheme on 
their variables, so as to identify which one leads to the creation of a single FSI that 
outperform the rest of them. They try four methodologies: factor analysis (which uses 
weighted linear combinations of the variables), credit weights (the contribution of 
each market to the total credit available in the Canadian economy is the important 
factor here), the variance-equal weights approach (by standardizing each variable by 
                                                 
2 These are financial, banking, macroeconomics and debt variables. For details, please consult the 
paper. 
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subtracting its mean and dividing the result by its standard deviation) and a 
cumulative distribution function approach. Based on the different indices’ 
performance (in terms of Type-I and Type-II errors, as defined by their survey for 
extreme events in the Canadian economy), they conclude that the best financial stress 
index seem to be the credit-weighted one, although, in individual markets, some other 
indexes might perform quite well. 
Considerable effort is being made to introduce such policy tools in the central 
banks’ financial monitoring ammunition, especially from economists of the US 
Federal Reserve System. A number of different methodological approach is used for 
the construction of these indices. For instance, the Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
(KCFSI), as developed by Hakkio and Keeton (2009) is very close to ours. Their 
index consists of eleven variables, representing one or more of the features financial 
stress has3.These are the TED spread, the 2-years swap spread (which is the difference 
between a floating rate payment, based on LIBOR, from a fixed rate payment, which 
derives from the treasury bill rate, augmented by a premium), the yield differential of 
previously issued securities from the most recently issued one, of the same maturity 
(called as the off-the-run – on-the-run ten year treasury spread). Additionally, a 
number of bond spreads are also included in this index, together with the correlation 
of the stock returns with the two-year governmental bond yield, the implied volatility 
of the stock prices. Brave and Butter (2011) use a dynamic factor model that allows 
the inclusion of unbalanced series in the index. In this way, they take into account one 
hundred financial indicators for the US economy, with different frequency and time 
coverage (47 of them are weekly, 29 monthly and 24 quarterly series, covering the 
period 1971-2010). Their work is the foundation for the creation of the Chicago Fed 
FSI. Oet et al. (2010 and 2011) worked on the same type of distress indices and came 
up with the Cleveland FED FSI4. 
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to the development of 
such aggregate distress indices for developing economies as well. For instance, 
Morales and Estrada (2010) compute an FSI for Colombia. They include banks’ 
profitability and probabilities of default, as components of their indexes, together with 
a series of variables that sketch out the capital, liquidity and credit risk conditions of 
                                                 
3 “Flight to quality” and “Flight to liquidity”. 
4 A thorough review of the US financial stress indexes is provided by Kliesen et al. (2012), together 
with a forecasting exercise. 
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the country. Additionally, the authors construct one index for each different type of 
financial institutions that operate in the Colombian market5. Additionally, they apply 
three different weighting schemes; the most commonly used variance-equal weighting, 
principal components analysis and count data modelling. According to this work, the 
FSI behaviour, irrespective of the weights applied, is similar and accurately represents 
the financial instability period of the Colombian economy on late 90’s. The same 
holds for the institutional indices as well. Similar work on systemic risk metrics for 
emerging economies can be found to Debuque-Gonzales et al. (2013) and Osorio et al. 
(2011), among others. 
A first attempt to construct an FSI for the Euro area has been made by 
Grimaldi (2010). Based on the indicators proposed by Nelson and Perli (2006), the 
author has a threefold intention: to specify the actual stress period for the Euro zone 
markets, to compute relevantly accurate indices and test whether her index can work 
as a leading indicator of stressful events. For the first goal, the author employs 
information contained in European Central Bank’s communication (using ECB’s 
Monthly Bulletins) to help her measuring financial market stress. In this way, she 
indicates periods that seem to reflect periods of financial upheaval6. In order to verify 
these findings, a financial fragility index is built, using sixteen variables from the 
bond, banking, equity and money markets. Specifically, the difference between each 
Euro zone’s country long term bond yields from the German one represents the 
sovereign bond spreads. Additionally, bank equity prices index and the AA-rated 
corporate bond spreads are used as proxies of the conditions prevailing in the banking 
sector. General equity index, actual earnings per share and equities risk premium were 
chosen for the equity market component of the indicator. Regarding money markets, 
one and three month Euribor-EONIA rates spreads, together with the spread of the 
main refinancing rate and the two year bond yield were utilized. All these variables 
were then integrated into two indices, the first being the weighted (by the inverse of 
each variable’s variance) average of them, while the second one is the rate of change. 
Finally, these two indexes were combined into a single indicator, with the help of a 
logit model, so that extraction of information on stressful periods to be more effective.  
                                                 
5 These are commercial banks, mortgage banks, commercial financial companies and financial 
cooperatives. Their sample is comprised of 170 institutions, for the period 1995.1-2008.11. 
6 This has been done by counting how many times specific words appear in the bank’s bulletin. 
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Using weekly data for the period July 1999 to October 2009, the contingent financial 
stress index works well and captures crises periods of the last 10 years. Grimaldi 
(2010) confirms the good functionality of her FSI, comparing its performance with 
the VSTOXX index 7  and the signaling methodology, popularized by Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). 
Beyond the construction of aggregate Eurozone- wide financial stress indices, 
some economists have proceeded to the creation of country – specific indices. 
Especially for countries that are in the centre of the current debt crisis, the interest in 
examining their financial conditions is quite intensive. For instance, Louzis and 
Vouldis (2011) compute an FSI for Greece, using both market and balance sheet data. 
According to the authors, such an index is useful for, both, policy design (through the 
identification of the state of the financial system), as well as for the dating and 
prediction of financial stress. The authors follow the framework proposed by Hollo et 
al. (2012), who use the components’ correlation, in order to assess systemic stress. 
Moreover, they extend this approach, by using multivariate GARCH modeling, so that 
they can be able to capture time-varying correlations of the index components. The 
choice of the variables that are included in their analysis is based on their relevance to 
economic theory and the respective empirical literature. Thus, they focus on series 
capturing systemic stress, increased uncertainty and chancing expectations in the 
financial markets. Their set of variables consists of the following segments: 
fundamentals of the Greek economy (the sovereign bond spread, the realized volatility 
of the Greek government bond and the correlation of the Greek stocks returns with the 
German Bund), variables from the Greek banking sector (banks stock index, the 
realized volatility of the banks index, the bank equities’ beta, the bank bond spreads 
which is the spread of the bond yields issued by Greek banks from the German 
governmental bond), the equities market and the money market (the TED spread). 
Turning to the authors’ construction methodology for their index, they first use 
principal components analysis to construct sub-indices for the aforementioned groups 
of variables. They do this, using the first principal component in each case. Then, as it 
was mentioned above, the framework by Hollow et al. (2012) is followed. The 
authors consider portfolio based approach to aggregate the sub-indices into a common 
FSI. The rationale is that, whenever correlation among the different market increases, 
                                                 
7 It is an implied volatility index, based on equity option prices. 
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financial upheaval increases as well. In order to evaluate the usefulness of their FSI, 
the authors graphically inspect its behavior. There is evidence that the index can 
accurately capture periods of financial turmoil, while the sub-indices inspection 
reveals the relevant importance of the different market segments. According to this 
decomposition, the money market seems to be the most important contributor to the 
present crisis, while economic fundamentals are also quite important. It is interesting 
that the banks balance sheet index minimally affect the level of financial risk, 
probably because of the limited exposure of Greek banks to “toxic assets” effects. A 
final evaluation of the index is provided from a survey that was conducted among 
financial experts of the Greek financial market. 
A similar effort to the previous one is made by Angelopoulou et al. (2012). 
The authors try to construct financial conditions indexes for the Euro area as a whole, 
together with indices for some Eurozone countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain). In their case, three different types of indices are formulated, one 
including monetary variables (so that the monetary policy effect can be evaluated), 
one without the aforementioned variables and, finally, one which is the difference 
between the previous one and an index computed through a principal components 
analysis, where the monetary policy loading are set to zero by the authors. Proceeding 
to their data selection, the authors choose twenty four variables, for the Eurozone 
aggregate index, while twenty are those included in the country specific ones. The 
choice is driven from, both, data availability, as well as based on the previous 
literature on this research topic. In this line of thought, the researchers incorporate 
several types of interest rate spreads (such as spreads between different types of loans 
and deposits), together with spreads from the interbank market (for instance, the 
three-month Euribor from the EONIA rate). Moreover, a number of quantity 
indicators are also included, like the value of debt securities issued by non-financial 
corporations and monetary institutions. Finally, a number of survey series (related to 
banks’ liquidity position and consumer creditworthiness), along with series 
representing the volatility risk of stock and bond prices are also included in their 
stress indices. In order to create their aggregate indexes, these authors proceed to their 
analysis based on principal components methodology.  Angelopoulou et al. (2012) 
use the first three principal components for the Euro Area, while for the country 
specific indices the first four. The decision criterion is that the components included 
in the analysis to explain, about, 70% of the total variance. Then, the contribution of 
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each one of the series in the final index is calculating, based on the loading of them in 
each component, weighted according to the level of variance explained by each one of 
these principal components. The final step is to weight the computed indices by the 
exact share of variance that the components which are included in the analysis explain. 
Based on the loading weights, the authors suggest that each principal component 
represent different kind of influence in the financial conditions. For instance, it is 
evident that the most important variables in the first principal component are the 
survey variables, while interbank market spreads and bond volatility are also 
important. On the other hand, bank credit variables and securities issuance ones seem 
to be more important in the second component, while the third component emphasizes 
the role of the spreads between loans and deposits. In the weighted loading case, the 
magnitude of the variables is, in general terms, as it is expected to be. By inspecting 
the FCIs graphs, there seems to be a tendency to loosen financial conditions, since the 
beginning of the sample (2003, with end of 2011 to be the end of the sample here)8. 
This situation prevailed until early 2007, when the financial conditions began to 
worsen. In the case of the countries FCIs, it is evident the existence of asymmetric 
responses to the varying financial conditions. The situation in Germany diverges from 
the other countries under investigation, both in the pre-crisis period and in the post-
crisis period. In the last two years of the sample (since 2010), situation worsens in 
Greece and Portugal mainly, while in Germany are improved. Generally, it is shown 
that monetary policy effects are not unanimous in the whole Eurozone, something that 
indicates the need for particular attention on the kind of policies prescriptions 
proposed by ECB. 
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
3.1 Dataset Description 
 
                                                 
8 in the case of Financial Conditions Index, loosening conditions are captured by increasing level of the 
index, while tighter conditions by decreasing level of it. 
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In order to depict the effects of a financial turmoil in a systemic wide level, we 
employ data from four markets, for each one of the initial Eurozone members9: the 
banking sector, money market, equity market and bond market. In all cases, we use 
monthly data, ranging from January 2004 until August 2011. The selection of 
variables is based, partly, on previous work done on systemic risk issues, as well as on 
variables that are important on the formulation of the state of the financial systems. In 
the following table, we provide an overview of the series used. An important 
innovation here, compared to the previous literature in this area is the inclusion of an 
extensive number of balance sheet data, for a wide number of European banks. The 
multifaceted nature of the current crisis that hit hard many major banks around 
Europe, in many cases without obvious underlying reasons, stated the examination of 
balance sheet indicators very crucial. Depending on data availability, the number of 
banks by each country that has been incorporated to the construction of the bank and 
the aggregate index varies (from one bank to Belgium and Netherlands to eight for 
Greece). 
In any case, our sample consists of 41 banks, covering major banks from all 
countries and banks with big market capitalization, size and market power. The 
limitation on the number of the financial institutions is dictated by the fact that many 
of them are not listed to a stock exchange and, as a consequence, there is a lack of 
data on their market performance. There are five groups of variables for each one of 
the bank, while the last one, called “overall market conditions”, represent the general 
conditions prevailing in the banking sector of each country (here, the series are market 
wide, not bank specific ones). So, the number of the indicators included for the 
banking stress index of each country varies from 27 variables (in cases where only 
one bank for a country is used) to 181 variables (in the case of Greek banks). The data 
are retrieved from various sources, but most of the balance sheet ones are from 
Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database. Since most of these series are provided in 
yearly or quarterly basis, they are interpolated into monthly frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 These are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (since 2001), Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 1: Indicators of Financial Stress 
Operational/ Profitability Liquidity Assets Quality
ROA Interbank Ratio NPL/Gross Loans
ROE Net Loans/Total Assets Loan Loss Reserves/Total Loans
EPS Loans/Deposits Loan Loss Reserves/Impaired Loans
P/E Total Liabilities/Liquid Assets Size
Inefficiency Interbank Funds/Liquid Assets Market Power
Net Interest Margin
Capital Adequacy Volatility Risk Overall Market Conditions
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Stock Returns Deposit Gap
Total Capital Ratio Dividend Yield Loan Gap
Market Value Bank Equities Realized Volatility
Turnover by Volume Banking Sector Beta
Bank Equities Returns
TED Spread M2 Growth
Inverted Term Spread M2/Foreign Exchange Reserves
Treasury Bill Realized Volatility Intermediation Rate
Main Refinancing Rate - 2yr 
Government Bond Yield
Main Refinancing Rate - 5yr Government Bond Yield
Equity Market Bond Market
Stock Returns Sovereign Spread
EPS Government Bond Realized Volatility
Dividend Yield Corporate Spread
P/E Government Bond Duration
Stocks Realized Volatility Stock Returns/German Bund Realized Correlation
Variables Used in Financial Stress Indices
Banking Sector
Money Market
 
 
 
In the first category, there are series representing the operational 
characteristics and banks’ profitability determinants. Here, returns on assets (ROA), 
as well as returns on equity (ROE) are crucial ratios for the evaluation of the smooth 
performance of a bank. As indicated by Morales and Estrada (2010), these two 
variables depict the efficiency of the banks on employing their available funds, while 
on the same time are accurate representations of the level of profits they produce. 
Thus, it is evident the importance of their inclusion in this fragility index, since banks 
with low level of profitability are more susceptible to default. Additionally, regarding 
ROE, Louzis et. al (2012) emphasize its importance as a measure of the cost 
efficiency and of the efficacy with which banks use their internal and external 
financing. On the other hand, earning per share (EPS) ratio and P/E ratio are also 
indicative of the financial health of these institutions. The former is a well known 
metric of profitability, the behavior of which is indicative of the banks’ ability to cope 
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with strenuous financial conditions 10 . Price-to-earnings ratio works in the same 
fashion. Since a decline of the P/E ratio would represent decreasing profitability for a 
financial institution, it is reasonable to include this variable with a negative sign in the 
following empirical work. Inefficiency, which is the ratio of operating expenses with 
operating income, is a very efficient proxy for how prudent a bank is. In their work 
for the determinants of non performing loans, Louzis et. al (2012) propose the use of 
inefficiency as a measure of banks management quality, in terms of their ability to 
monitor and avoid excessive funding to default – like investments. Thus, it is natural 
to include this indicator to our dataset. Finally, net interest margin, defined as the 
bank’s income from its intermediation activities, is also included in the set of 
indicators as an important contributor to the banks financial robustness. 
The second group of variables consists of liquidity indicators. The interbank 
ratio represents the value of funds a bank lent to other banks over the money it has 
borrowed by others. In this way, interbank ratio is a good proxy for financial 
instability transmission, since it represents the exposure of each bank to funds from 
other banks. The ratio of net loans to total assets is a ratio of dual nature, in the sense 
that it, concurrently, depicts the degree of liquidity of an economy (since the higher 
the financial leverage of a banking system, the higher should be this ratio), but on the 
same time it is a variable mirrored the banks portfolio quality and sustainability. Thus, 
it is a metric with ambiguous sign, regarding its contribution to excessive systemic 
risk or not. On the other hand, loans-to-deposits ratio is another important variate. A 
higher value of this testifies lower liquidity available for banks, while the exposure to 
default risk is, also, greater. It can be considered as a good funding proxy, as well, if 
its usefulness as a measure is viewed from the economy’s aspect. This set of 
indicators concludes with two liquidity risk ratios, namely the total liabilities to liquid 
assets and the interbank funds – liquid assets one11. The reason behind the inclusion 
of these two indicators has, mostly, to do with their importance for the capability of a 
bank to cope with situations of increasing default rates and deepening recession of the 
economy. In this sense, the higher these ratios are, the more vulnerable the banks 
become. 
                                                 
10 Grimaldi (2010) and Louzis and Vouldis (2012) pinpoint the negative relation of EPS ratio with 
cases of increasing financial stress. Thus, we incorporate it with negative sign in the stress indexes 
construction. 
11 Morales, M. and Estrada D. (2010), “A Financial Stability Index for Colombia”, Annals of Finance, 
6:555-581 
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Moreover, the quality of the assets a bank has to its portfolio is of utmost 
importance for its survival in an uncertain financial environment. As it is well known, 
credit risk is the main type or risk that banks must manage and be cautious towards it. 
Thus, the reserves of such a financial institution, which are capital provisions for 
cases of bad loans writing offs, compared to its loans portfolio (both total and the 
impaired ones) is crucial. As Puddu (2008) indicates, these measures are proxies of 
the quality deterioration in banks’ balance sheets12. Thus, a positive contribution on 
the crisis index should be expected. On the same time, the credit risk they face is 
negatively related their size and market power 13 . Finally, the analogy of non 
performing loans to total loans is, clearly, evident of the quality of loans in a bank’s 
portfolio and a positive sign is expected for its contribution to the financial stress 
index. 
The capital adequacy indicators are those dictated by the Basel Accord, related 
to the minimum capital needed for the default risk coverage by the banks. In the group 
of volatility risk variables, we include those series which abnormal behavior renders 
the bank vulnerable to market risks and instabilities. For instance, higher stock returns 
indicate heightened uncertainty among investors, something that can have serious 
effects on the bank’s operation and viability. Moreover, dividend yield can, 
potentially, give negative signal for a bank, since it is negatively related to the 
robustness of a financial institution’s fundamentals. Market value and turnover by 
volume are, also, closely related to market sentiment, with a feedback loop existing 
between their level and market uncertainty (and, of course, with the level of financial 
stress). Turnover by volume is defined as the number of a bank’s equities traded on 
any particular date, usually given in thousands of stocks. Thus, increasing turnover for 
a bank’s equity provides signals against this institution’s viability and vigor. 
General conditions of the banking sector of each Euro Area economy are 
sketched out by the last bunch of variables used for this market. In the same fashion 
as Louzis and Vouldis (2012), we employ the so called deposit and loan gaps. These 
are produced, using the Hodrick – Prescott filter, proposed by the aforementioned 
economists in 1997, in order to extract the cyclical component of the deposits and 
                                                 
12 The tendency to increase loan loss reserves is indication of worsening balance sheets, since banks in 
this way admit their concern on losses on their loans portfolio. On the same time, it can be considered 
as a sign of prudence from their side. In any case, in the literature, the first case is considered as more 
important and effective on the role of this indicator. 
13 Size is the value of each bank’s assets, compared to market’s total, while market power is related to 
loans given, to total value of them. For details, consult Louzis et. al (2012). 
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loans of each bank from the trend element of them. This is a useful approach, 
indicating the cumulative dynamics of these two important elements of banks balance 
sheets. Increasing deposit gap is indication of deposit shortage, while a loan gap can 
be interpreted as higher market uncertainty and, thus, reluctance from the banks to 
provide loans. The level of investors’ uncertainty is depicted by the realized volatility 
of the bank equities index for each country. Increasing values of this volatility 
measure represent increasing financial upheaval. A very common component for 
stress indices is the beta coefficient of the banking sector index14. High beta values 
are an indication of banking sector equities to be considered as riskier and, thus, 
investors’ sentiment is against them. Finally, we also include the bank sector index 
returns, in the same logic as the stock price returns of the individual banks. 
Proceeding with the discussion of the variables included in the other three 
markets investigated here, we begin with the money market. Here, eight variables are 
included in the dataset. One of the most frequently used series for financial stress 
indices construction is the so called TED spread. It is the difference of the uncovered 
interbank short term lending towards a short term treasury bill (usually the 90-days 
treasury bill). For the case of Eurozone, the former is the well known 3-month Euribor, 
which is the benchmark and basic rate based on what European banks offer funds in 
the interbank market. The use of this indicator is popular, since it represents both, 
counterparty risk and liquidity risk in the markets. In times of increasing uncertainty 
and financial instability, problems of adverse selection can rise, since lending banks 
would be unable to identify the most financially reliable banks while the need for 
funds can be excessively high. Thus, increasing TED spread is expected for times of 
heightening financial fragility. Additionally, the slope of the yield curve is used, 
sometimes called inverted term spread. It is nothing more than the difference of the 
yield of short –term governmental securities from the long term ones (here, the 3 
month treasury bill from the 10 year government bond yield is used). The reason for 
including this variable has to do with the well justified, from the literature, ability of 
the yield curve to work as leading indicator of the real economic activity15. Hence, a 
forthcoming recession greatly affects the financial position of many debt ridden firms 
and the default risk is highly exacerbated. Additionally, it is a good indicator of the 
                                                 
14 It is used in most cases of FSI construction. For instance in Louzis and Vouldis (2012), Slingenberg 
and de Haan (2011), Melvin and Taylor (2009) and many others. 
15 Mishkin, F. S. and Estrella, A. (1998), “Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial Variables as Leading 
Indicators”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80(1): pp. 45-61 
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investors’ expectations on future short term interest rates. Since, during period of 
financial turmoil, the need for liquidity is higher and more intensive, investors turn to 
more easily liquidated securities, like the treasury bills. In turn, this affects their 
returns, expanding the spread between the aforementioned securities. The next two 
indicators, namely the spread of the main European refinancing rate from the two and 
three – year government bond yields are also strong indicators of monetary liquidity. 
As it is emphasized by Grimaldi (2010), the decrease of these spreads represents 
liquidity worsening situation. For this reason, we incorporate these two indicators 
with negative signs in the analysis, so that their deterioration can indicate increasing 
level of financial suffocation. Growth of money supply and the ratio of money stock 
to the economy’s foreign exchange reserves are two series, coming from the prior 
literature on early warning indicators of currency and banking crises. As it is evident 
from Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), the 
previously mentioned variables are among the successful leading indicators for 
forthcoming currency and banking crises. Since both can produce signals, long before 
the actual outbreak of a crisis event, and since they both represent values of utmost 
importance for the economy’s growth rate and the total credit available, their 
inclusion to this dataset is advantageous. The realized volatility of the treasury bill 
rate is incorporated here, representing the uncertainty and excessive abnormality of 
the money market, since treasury bills are those securities with the highest value of 
transactions in short term borrowing markets. Finally, the intermediation spread is the 
difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Even though, it is a variable that is, 
partly, reflects the level of profitability of financial intermediaries, it is contained in 
this group of variables, since it is also a strong indication of the available sources of 
credit and its supply level into the economy. 
In the equity market group, we include five variables. Firstly, the stock returns 
are incorporated, with negative signs since the large negative returns are those that 
create the greatest uncertainty for investors. Then, the earnings to price ratio (with a 
negative signs in the formation of the stress indices, because of the reasons stated in 
the banking sector analysis) and the P/E ratio are chosen, as major variables 
representing the profitability and health of the market participants. Moreover, 
dividend yield is another series, reflecting the robustness of the stock market. Thus, its 
inclusion is important, since its behavior is a sign of listed companies’ ability to cope 
with financial strain. This set of indexes is concluded with the realized volatility of 
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the stock markets’ general indexes. As in all previous cases, the realized volatility is 
computed, using daily data, as the sum of squared logarithmic returns, adjusted by the 
trading days of each year in the sample. 
The last set of series has to do with the bond markets of Euro Area countries. 
An important contributor in this group is the sovereign bond spread, calculated as the 
difference between each country’s long term government bond yields from the 
German long term bond yield. It is reasonable to follow this convention, since the 
German economy is considered as the strongest, most prudent economy of the union16. 
This indicator represents the sovereign risk each country faces. Then, the realized 
volatility of each country’s long term bond is used, again using daily data on their 
yields. Increasing uncertainty and flight-to-quality phenomena, sprung by excessive 
systemic stress level, would lead to higher volatility. The corporate bond spread, 
defined as the spread between the corporate bond yield from the governmental one. In 
this way, the default risk and inability of firms in times of financial strain to acquire 
the necessary capital for their operation, is depicted. An innovative feature of the 
dataset is the use of government bond duration. It is an interesting variable, since it 
represents the sensitivity of bonds prices to changes in interest rates. In general, it is 
expected to have a negative relation between bond duration and interest rates. Based 
on the volatile behavior of interest rates in periods of financial uncertainty, there not 
seems to be a consensus on the kind of effects a financially instable period have on 
bonds duration. On the other hand, recent research by Lee et al. (2012) and Lee et al. 
(2011) indicates the strong effect that excessive sovereign risk has on governmental 
bonds. According to these authors, the duration decreases, especially for bond with 
lower ratings. As a result, the heightening investors’ concerns on possible default of 
debt strangled countries with low rated bonds, should lead to lower duration for the 
bonds of these troubled countries. The last indicator here is the so called realized 
correlation of each country’s stock returns with the German Bund. With this variate, 
we aim to include the effects of the financial instability on the investors’ decision to 
withdraw their invested funds from a troubled economy to one that is perceived as 
safe (in Eurozone’s case, Germany). Again, this indicator is computed using daily 
data on our sample’s general stock indices and the German long term government 
bond yield. 
                                                 
16 For the case of the Germany itself, we just include the yield of its 10 year governmental bond. 
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3.2 Methodological Approach 
 
Our decision, regarding the construction methodology of our financial stress 
indices, follows the literature. We intend to calculate the FSIs based on the equally – 
weighted approach. According to this approach, an equal weight is attributed to all 
variables in each of the markets. In this way, the sectoral indices are computed, while 
the same approach is followed for the country – wide one. It should be emphasized 
here the fact that each series is demeaned and divided by its standard deviation. This 
is useful for two reasons: it helps avoiding problems of mis-measurement in the series, 
while it is also a necessary transformation, in order to evaluate the size of the financial 
instability in each time period, in terms of deviation from the mean value of the series. 
In the second stage of our analysis, we intend to explore potential existence of 
interactions and interrelations of the stress indices, on a cross country level. In order 
to do this, we are going to employ VAR models, one of the most popular empirical 
approaches for analysing causal relationships between macroeconomic and financial 
variables. Since these models were propagated by Sims (1980), they became 
something like a workhorse for macroeconomic and macro-financial empirical 
investigation. Especially, in cases where prior economic theorizing or established 
causal relations between some economic or financial measures do not exist, the use of 
such a data driven econometric approach sounds natural. 
In general, a VAR model consists of a number of equations, where all 
variables are considered as endogenous. Each equation incorporates lagged values of 
the dependent variable, in addition to lagged values of the rest of the variables. In the 
case of k variables and k error terms, the VAR(p) model is of the following form: 
 
 1 1 2 2t t t t t tFSI FSI FSI FSI             (1)
  
where 
'
1, 2,  ,  t t t k tFSI FSI FSI FSI    is a vector of all the endogenous variables of 
our model and 
'
1, 2, ,   t t t k t        is the vector of the error terms of the model, 
which are usually considered to be white errors, with a zero mean and constant 
variance. Finally,  ( 1,   , )i i t  are the kxk matrices of the coefficients that need to 
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be estimated by the model. For our case, we employ a VAR model with eleven 
equations17. 
In the case of an unrestricted VAR model, the estimation can be done, using 
the usual OLS estimator. Of course, in order to have stable and robust results, it is 
necessary to test our series for their order of integration. Thus, before proceeding to 
our models’ specification, we proceed with performing stationarity testing of the 
original series. The main test used is the augmented Dickey – Fuller (1979) test, while 
in case where the results were dubious, Phillips – Perron (1988) and KPSS (1992) test 
were also performed to verify whether or not a specified variable is stationary or not. 
The optimum number of lags for the equations is chosen by a number of lag selection 
criteria (the Akaike, the Schwarz and the Hannan – Quinn information criteria). Not 
all of these criteria should indicate the same number of lags for a model. As it is 
discussed by Luetkepohl (2011), Akaike criterion is usually the most tolerant 
(provides evidence for higher lag order), while Schwarz criterion chooses the shorter 
order. The general idea is to begin modelling with a moderate lag structure, which is 
what we do, given the time span covered and the number of equations involved in the 
estimations. Models’ adequacy is examined through the inspection of the residuals 
behaviour 18 , even though, as commented by Luetkepohl (2011), residuals non-
normality is not a problematic situation for the validity of the inference conducted 
with these models.  
The importance of this empirical investigation lies on the detection of 
channels of financial stress propagation from country to country. Canova (2007) 
mentions that inference through the estimated VAR coefficients is not an efficient 
approach to use these models. Instead, he suggests the use of impulse responses, as an 
efficient way to study the interrelations and causal relationships of the endogenous 
variables included in such a model. Impulse response analysis is the trace of a one – 
unit innovation to one of the system’s variable to itself and to the rest of the variables 
under investigation. This approach is really useful on pointing and analysing the 
effect of a structural change to any of the included financial stress indicators to the 
level of financial stress in the Euro Area countries. Here, we employ both the well-
known Cholesky decomposition approach, where the variables ordering (in terms of 
                                                 
17 This is the case of country wide models, where we estimate models for financial stress index in 
national level. 
18 That is, whether they are normally distributed, heteroskedastic or autocorrelated. 
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the sequence of the unexpected shocks involved) is important, while the generalized 
impulse responses, as proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), are employed as 
robustness checks in the aforementioned methodology. Here, the derived orthogonal 
set of innovations renders variables ordering obsolete. 
 
 
4. Eurozone’s Financial Stress Narrative 
 
 
The following graph depicts the aggregate Euro Area- wide Financial Stress 
Index. As it is previously noted, the period covered is from January 2004 to August 
2011. Thus, there is a wide coverage of, both, the initiation of the global financial 
crisis, its evolution and transformation to the current situation faced by the most 
indebted members of the monetary union. In general, the index indicates some minor 
fluctuations to its value, prior to 2007, without any of those presenting a serious threat 
for the stability of the markets. On the other hand, it is evident a slow but steady 
gradual increase in the level of financial stress, which reached its climax in the third 
quarter of 2008. The reason cannot be other than the Lehman Brothers collapse that 
took place in September 2008, with a number of major repercussions to the world 
financial system. In this case, the index reached it maximum value of 0.84 on October 
2008, while it remained in high level until the end of the first quarter of 2009. In the 
meantime, the European Central Bank, through a number of unconventional monetary 
policies initiatives, tried to stabilize the increased systemic risk and uncertainty in the 
markets. For instance, right after the Lehman Brothers collapse and the, consecutive 
drying up of the interbank money market, the Eurozone’s monetary authority 
proceeded to the acceptance of more  financial assets, as collateral for the emergency 
funding, while on 2009 the covered bonds program was populated. Together with the 
decrease of the main refinancing rate by ECB, it was expected and apparent from the 
graph above an abatement of the financial stress level. But this would not last for long, 
since the evolving crisis in Greece led to another outbreak of financial stress, on April 
and May 2010. The agreement on a rescue program seemed to tranquil the Eurozone 
economy, for a while, until another spike in the index came out as a consequence of 
the need for financial assistance and fiscal austerity measures, this time for Ireland 
(towards the end of 2010) and Portugal in early 2011. The financial stress remained 
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excessively high, until the end of our sample, which includes the decision for the 
haircut on the Greek public debt. Similar patterns in the behaviour of the country 
specific financial stress indices are identified in the respective graph, in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 1: Level of Financial Stress for Euro Area 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we proceed to a more systematic analysis of the 
interconnections and the level of transmission of systemic stress from one country of 
the Eurozone to the others. In order to do this, a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
is employed, which includes the financial stress indexes of the eleven Euro Area 
countries under examination. As a result, a model with eleven equations is used, the 
lags of which were chosen according to the usual well-known criteria19. Based on the 
different specifications, the residuals normality and autocorrelation tests, the model 
chosen to be presented is a VAR(1) model. The following graphs represent the 
impulse responses of this model, where the effects of a financial shock in each one of 
                                                 
19 AIC, SIC, HQ criteria. 
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the countries we examine are depicted. Additionally, two tables summarizing the 
effects presented in the impulse response graphs are provided. In there, a narrative 
short description of the different types of effects is provided, for the reader’s 
convenience. 
The results offer some quite interesting and intriguing illustrations for the 
Eurozone crisis. First of all, it seems that, in all cases, countries are mostly responsive 
to their own financial shocks. With the exceptions of Finland, Belgium, Italy and 
Greece, the excessive financial stress soon returns to its prior levels. In case of Greece, 
the effect lasts for almost a year after the initial shock, while Finland’s one is even 
more persistent. Additionally, some degree of regionalism is apparent in the results. 
According to the impulse responses, the peripheral debt-ridden countries are more 
responsive to the increasing financial stress of the same group of countries, while the 
similar effect is sketched for the major Euro Area countries, notably Germany, France, 
Netherlands and Finland. This implies the existence of disparities in the way that 
financial shocks reflect on the union’s member countries, while it can be also an 
indication to ECB for adoption of different policies in countries that face divergent 
financial and economic obstacles. Another important finding, which appears to 
contradict the mainstream view on the current crisis, is the minor effects that 
increasing financial stress in Greece and Portugal seem to have to the rest of the 
Eurozone countries. According to the impulse response graphs above, there is no 
evidence of transmission of heightening financial risk from these troubled countries to 
the rest. On the other hand, the Italian financial upheaval has some effect on most 
countries, although not always in the expected way (negative effect on the level of 
financial stress). In any case, the previously mentioned finding, for the minor role of 
Greece and Portugal in the crisis transmission is concurrent by recent research, for 
instance Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Johnson (forthcoming). In this work, the authors 
emphasize the fact that, according to their stochastic volatility model, most of the risk 
associated with the current Eurozone countries is country specific, while they could 
not provide any hard evidence to blame Greece or Portugal as major channels of crisis 
contagion to the rest of the Euro Area. 
 
 23 
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
A
U
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
B
E
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
IF
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
F
R
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
E
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
G
R
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IR
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
IT
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
1012
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
N
E
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
P
O
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 A
U
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 B
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 F
IF
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 F
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 G
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 G
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 I
R
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 I
T
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 N
E
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 P
O
F
S
I
-
0
.5
0
.
0
0
.
5
1
.
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f 
S
P
F
S
I 
to
 S
P
F
S
I
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 o
f F
in
a
n
c
ia
l S
tr
e
s
s
 In
d
ic
e
s
 L
e
v
e
l t
o
 F
in
a
n
c
ia
l S
tr
e
s
s
 S
h
o
c
k
s
 
 24 
 
 
6. Further Evidence and Robustness Checks 
 
In order to examine our results resilience, we provide further evidence in 
favour of our baseline model results. Such evidence is provided in several ways. 
Firstly, a multivariate granger causality test is applied, examining the direction of 
potential transmission channels on a country level. Secondly, we adopt an alternative 
impulse responses’ approach allowing the results to be irrelevant of the ordering we 
apply. Then, we exclude all balance-sheet data from our dataset, regarding the 
banking sector, allowing our analysis to be implemented for high frequency-market 
data. We also consider whether the presence of a US financial stress index or the use 
of an extended sample would alter the major findings of our work. Finally, we split 
the sample in pre- and post-crisis period, in order to reveal potential discrepancies 
between the two time periods. 
The block exogeneity test refers to a multivariate Granger causality test, 
providing further evidence concerning the interconnection of the financial stress 
indices. As it is well known, Granger (1969) examines whether a variable x is better 
explained from an equation including, both past values of x itself, along with lagged 
values of another variable, say y. In equational form, for the case of two variables (x 
and y) it should be: 
 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
t t i t i t i t i t
t t i t i t i t i t
y c y y x x
x c x x y y u
    
   
   
   
       
       
 (2) 
 
where the number of lags included in each equation is determined from the usual 
information criteria. Using F-type statistics, they null hypothesis examined is whether 
y does not Granger cause x (and vice versa). In case of a VAR model, with more than 
two endogenous variables, the Granger causality testing procedure remains similar. 
The block-exogeneity test is useful for testing whether the lagged values of a variable 
do not Granger cause the dependent variable. It is very similar to the aforementioned 
Granger causality test, adapted for the case where more than one lagged variables are 
included in the model’s equations. In order to perform this test, the coefficients of the 
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lagged values of the variable to be tested, are set equal to zero and a likelihood ratio 
statistic is used to evaluate the potential causality relationship of this variable with the 
regressand. Using this test, extra evidence is provided, regarding the existence of 
potential financial risk transmission channels between the Eurozone economies and 
their respective markets. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
In the table above, the respective p-values, indicating the statistical 
significance of the potential causal relationship between the variables under 
examination, are reported. The hypothesis tested is whether the financial stress of 
each country reported in every row does not Granger cause the level of financial stress 
for each country depicted on every column. As it is evident, there is no any evidence 
for financial stress transmission within the Euro Area economies. The only notable 
exception is Finland, which presents a peculiar, statistical significant effect towards 
all the other economies. Especially, for the case of core countries, the causal effect is 
very significant. Italian stress index also granger causes to a number of economies, 
with bidirectional effects to exist with Ireland, France and Finland. Again, there is no 
any evidence for Greek and Portuguese financial stress to transmit to the rest of the 
monetary union. The same holds for Spain. 
Then, an alternative specification for the estimation of the relevant impulse 
response functions is provided. This is the generalized version of impulse responses, 
as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). This is an alternative 
to shocks’ orthogonalization, proposed by Sims (1980). In this respect, there is no 
need to apply any judgemental decision on the variables ordering. The produced 
shocks are invariant to ordering and the outcome is robust. Regarding the generalized 
impulse functions, the graphs, are provided in the following graph. Inspecting the 
relevant plots, one can concur on their unanimity with the initial impulse response 
analysis. 
 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
 
A final robustness check involves the exclusion of all bank balance sheet data 
we used in the financial stress indices construction. Since the aforementioned have a 
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much lower frequency, compared to the market level data, it is questionable whether 
their presence might affect the variability of the produced aggregate indexes. Such 
lower variability might, in turn, have an effect on the estimated VAR model and the 
produced impulse responses. Hence, we recalculated the financial stress indexes for 
each country, only this time without the bank balance sheet data. Based on the new 
systemic risk indices, a vector autoregressive model was estimated and the relevant 
generalized impulse responses are presented in the following graph. For most cases 
again, the financial stress transmission remains to very low level, indicating a lack of 
sustainable and persistent systemic risk effect towards any of the countries discussed 
here. The results of our baseline model are confirmed by this alternative version of 
aggregate systemic risk indicators. 
 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
 
Figure 5 presents the generalized impulse responses for the case of the 
extended sample use. Since our original model covers a period up to the third quarter 
of 2011, we decide to extend the sample until recently (September 2013). The 
rationale is to check whether the inclusion of a longer time horizon have any effect on 
the findings of our baseline approach. As it is evident from the graphs, this is not the 
case. The responses’ regionalism is still evident, especially among the core Euro Area 
economies. On the other hand, Ireland presents a somehow strong role as financial 
stress transmitter, towards the other economies of the union. In any case, the results 
remain robust, without any major discrepancies between the two different sample 
sizes. 
 
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
 
The employment of a US financial stress index in our model, in order to 
capture potential global influences within the Eurozone countries financial stress level, 
do not alter the findings of our baseline approach. The financial stress index used for 
the United States is the one developed by Hakkio and Keetong (2009). Based on these 
economists’ work, the Kansas City Fed created and maintains a financial stress index 
to monitor the evolution of the financial conditions in the American economy. The 
reason for choosing this index among many others is its resemblance, in theoretical 
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underpinnings and construction approach, with the indexes we produced for the Euro 
Area countries. Thus, our model is extended, including Kansas City Fed FSI as an 
additional endogenous variable. Based on this, it is clear that US financial stress level 
remains immune to Eurozone effects, while the opposite is not always the case. Some 
of the most advanced economies in Euro Area are susceptible to increasing financial 
distress from US. This spill-over effect is of low magnitude but persistent. This 
situations is not verified for the case of peripheral economies. The presence of US 
financial stress in the model does not affect the stress transmission level between the 
Eurozone economies. 
 
[Insert figure 8 about here] 
 
The examination of potential differences in the interconnections of the euro 
economies before and after the global crisis outbreak does not bring any surprise. 
September 2008 is chosen as the cut-off point, where the global financial crisis 
reached its peak, due to the Lehman Brothers collapse. Once again, Greece does not 
emerge as financial stress transmitters to the common currency area, irrespective of 
the time period investigated. On the same time, Spain, which has some positive and 
persistent effect on a number of countries in the pre-crisis period, do not show such 
behaviour in the second sub-sample. This is justifiable, given the unprecedented 
interventional policies implemented by the Euro Area authorities. Interestingly, Italy 
exhibits persistent effects in both periods, indicating the importance of the conditions 
in this economy for the whole euro union. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Aim of this work is the study of financial stress level of the countries that 
constitute the Euro Area. In this way, an early warning indicator of forthcoming 
financial turmoils can be constructed, which is able to provide timely indications of 
potential financial crashes. Additionally, a VAR model is employed, so that 
indications on the existence or not of financial stress transmission within the 
Eurozone countries can be provided. According to our results, countries are mostly 
responsive to their own financial shocks, while a degree of regionalism is evident, in 
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the sense that peripheral countries are more susceptible to their financial stress, while 
the same holds for the core Eurozone countries. Finally, in contrast to common 
wisdom, financial conditions in Greece and Portugal do not seem to affect the rest of 
the Euro Area, at least in the degree that Italy and Ireland do. These findings remain 
consistent and unaltered to a number of robustness checks. 
 29 
References 
 
Angelopoulou, E., Balfoussia, H. and Gibson, H. (2012), “Building a Financial 
Conditions Index for the Euro Area and selected Euro Area Countries: what does it 
tell us about the crisis?”, Bank of Greece Working Paper, no.147 
 
Brave, S. and A. Butters (2011), “Monitoring Financial Stability: A Financial 
Conditions Index Approach”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic 
Perspectives, 1Q/2011 
 
Canova, F. (2007), Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research, Princeton 
University Press 
 
Carlson, M., Kurt L., and Nelson. W., (2012), “Using Policy Intervention to Identify 
Financial Stress”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series, no. 02 
 
Debuque-Gonzales, M. and M. Socorro Gochoco-Bautista (2013), “Financial 
Conditions Indexes for Asian Economies”, Asian Development Bank Economics 
Working Paper Series, no. 333 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (1998), “The Determinants of Banking Crises 
in Developing and Developed Economies”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 45(1) 
 
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A. (1979), “Distribution of the Estimators for 
Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, vol. 74: pp. 427-431 
 
Granger, C. W. (1969), “Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and 
Cross-Spectral Methods”, Econometrica, vol. 37: pp. 424-438 
 
Grimaldi, M. (2010), “Detecting and Interpreting Financial Stress in the Euro Area”, 
ECB Working Paper Series, no. 1214 
 
Hakkio, C. and W. Keeton (2009), “Financial Stress: What is it, How Can it be 
Measured, and Why does it matter?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Economic 
Review 
 
Hodrick, R. J. and Prescott, E. C. (1997), “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An 
Empirical Investigation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 29(1): pp. 1-16 
 
 30 
Hollo, D., Kremer, M. and Lo Duca, M. (2012), “CISS – A composite indicator of 
systemic stress in the financial system”, ECB Working Paper Series, no. 1426 
 
Illing, M. and Y. Liu (2006), “Measuring Financial Stress in a Developed Country: 
An Application to Canada”, Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 2(3): pp. 243-265 
 
Kaminsky, G., Lizondo S. and Reinhart C. (1998), “Leading Indicators of Currency 
Crises”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 45(1) 
 
Kliesen, K. L., Owyang, M. T. and E. K. Vermann (2012), “Disentangling Diverse 
Measures: A Survey of Financial Stress Indexes”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, September/October 
 
Koop, G., Pesaran, M. H. and S. M. Potter (1996), “Impulse Response Analysis in 
Nonlinear Multivariate Models”, Journal of Econometrics, vol. 74: pp. 119 -147 
 
Kwiatkowski, D., Phillips, P. C., Schmidt, P. and Shin, Y. (1992), “Testing the Null 
Hypothesis of Stationary against the Alternative of a Unit Root”, Journal of 
Econometrics, vol. 54: pp. 159-178 
 
Lee, H. W., Xie, Y. A. amd Yau, J. (2011), “The Impact of Sovereign Risk on Bond 
Duration: Evidence from Asian Sovereign Bond Markets”, International Review of 
Economics and Finance, vol. 20(3): pp. 441-451 
 
Lee, H. W., Xie, Y. A. amd Yau, J. (2012), “Effects of Sovereign Risk on Duration: 
Evidence from European and Latin American Sovereign Bond Markets”, Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139752 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139752 
 
Louzis, D. and Vouldis, A. (2012), “A methodology for constructing a Financial 
Systemic Stress Index: an application to Greece”, Economic Modeling, vol. 29(4) 
 
Louzis, D., Vouldis, A. and Metaxas, V. (2012), “Macroeconomic and bank-specific 
determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, 
business and consumer loan portfolios”, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 36(4): 
pp. 1012 – 1027 
 
 31 
Luetkepohl, H. (2011), “Vector Autoregressive Models”, EUI Working Papers Series, 
no. 30 
 
Melvin, M. and Taylor, M. (2009), “The Crisis in the Foreign Exchange Market”, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 28(8): pp. 1317-1330 
 
Mishkin, F. S. and Estrella, A. (1998), “Predicting U.S. Recessions: Financial 
Variables as Leading Indicators”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80(1): 
pp. 45-61 
 
Morales, M. and Estrada D. (2010), “A Financial Stability Index for Colombia”, 
Annals of Finance, 6:555-581 
 
Nelson, W., and Perli, R. (2005), “Selected indicators of financial stability”, Irving 
Fisher Committee's Bulletin on Central Bank Statistics, 23, 92-105 
 
Oet, M., Eiben, R., Bianco, T., Gramlich, D., and S. Ong (2011), “The Financial 
Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland Working Paper Series, no. 11-30 
 
Oet, M., Eiben, R., Gramlich, D., Miller, G. and S. Ong (2010), “SAFE: An Early 
Warning System for Systemic Banking Risk”, in Conference:”Beyond the Financial 
Crisis: Systemic Risk, Spillovers and Regulation”, Dresden 
 
Osorio, C. Pongsaparn, R. and D. F. Unsal (2011), “A Quantitative Assessment of 
Financial Conditions in Asia”, IMF Working Paper Series, no. 170 
 
Pesaran, H. M. and Y. Shin (1998), “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in 
Linear Multivariate Models”, Economics Letters, vol. 58(1): pp. 17 - 29 
 
Phillips, P. C. and Perron, P. (1988), “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series 
Regression”, Biometrika, vol. 75: pp. 335-346 
 
Puddu, S. (2008), “Optimal Weights and Stress Banking Indexes”, HEC-Universite de 
Lausanne, mimeo 
 
Sandahl, J. F., Holmfeldt, M., Ryden, A. and Stromqvist, M. (2011), “An index of 
financial stress for Sweden”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, no. 2 
 
Sims, C. A. (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality”, Econometrica, vol. 48(1): pp. 1-
48 
 
Slingenberg, J. W. and de Haan, J. (2011), “Forecasting Financial Stress”, De 
Nederlandsche Bank Working Papers Series, no. 292 
 32 
Appendix 
 
 
Figure 2: Level of Financial Stress for each Eurozone Country 
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Table 1: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
---
negligible slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
---
negligible
slightly positive - minor
negligible
positive slightly positive - minor
negligible
slightly positive - minor
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
Effects of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries - 1 (FSI - 1 case)
negligible
slightly positive - minor
negligible
slightly positive - minor
negative
negative - minor
negative
negative
negligible
negative
negative - minor
negligible negligible negative - minor
negligible
slightly positive - minor
--- slightly positive - minornegligible
---
slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
negligible
negligible
negligible
Greece Portugal
negligible
negative - minor
---
ItalySpain Ireland
slightly positive - minor
negligible
negligible
slightly positive - minor
Note: This is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance - equal financial stress indices are used. 
The table is read column by column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock 
(and the producing result).
slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
negligible
slightly negative - minor
negligible
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Table 2: Summary of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries 
Response to
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
negligible negligible positive negative
negligible negligiblenegligible
France
--- negligible positive negligible
negative
negligible negligible ---
negligible
Austria Belgium NetherlandsFinland
negligiblepositive
negligible
Germany
negligible
---
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
slightly positive - minor
slightly positive - minor
negligible negligible
negligiblenegativenegligible
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible
negligiblenegligible
negligible negligible negligible negative
negligible
negligible positive
negligible negligible
negligible
negligible ---
Note: This is a summary of the impulse responses, produced using the baseline VAR model where the variance - equal financial stress indices are used. The table is read column by 
column, where each one of the latter represents a specific shock and each row shows the respective receiver of the shock (and the producing result).
Effects of Financial Stress Shocks in Eurozone Countries - 2 (FSI - 1 case)
negligible
negligiblepositivenegligiblenegligible
positive
negligible
negative
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
negligible
---positive
---
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